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I. INTRODUCTION
In Kamibayashi v. Japan,' the Tokyo District Court held, with
1. 29 I.L.M. 391 (1990). International Legal Materials provides the English
translation of the Tokyo District Court's "Summary of Reasons" and excerpts of the
Court's decision relating to claims based in international law. An analysis of the
Court's decision with regard to claims based in domestic law is beyond the scope of this
(111)
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regard to international law, that: (1) the 1949 Geneva Convention Rel-
ative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War2 (1949 Third Geneva Con-
vention) is not retroactive, and (2) the Power of Origin is not com-
pelled under customary international law to compensate its own
nationals that were held captive as prisoners of war (POWs) during
World War II. Judge Tetsunobu Kinoshita, delivering the judgment of
the Court,3 stated that absent an intent of the contracting parties or an
explicit provision to the contrary, the 1949 Third Geneva Convention is
not applicable to POWs who had been repatriated prior to the effective
date of the Convention.4 More controversially, however, the Court
found that neither Article 66 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention,
requiring the Power of Origin to settle the credit balances of POWs
upon termination of their captivity, nor Article 68, referring to the
Power of Origin any POW claims for compensation of work-related
injury or disability after repatriation, was a codification of prevailing
customary international law."
This note discusses Kamibayashi's impact on actions for compen-
sation brought by POWs against the Power of Origin. By lumping to-
gether the POWs' claim for wages with their claim for compensation of
injury, Kamibayashi denied injured POWs, as a subset of all wage-
seeking POWs, a separate and necessary cause of action based on cus-
case note. Contra Judicial Decisions in Japan, 32 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 125 (1989)
(providing an English translation of excerpts from the Court's decision, including those
related to domestic claims) [hereinafter Judicial Decisions].
2. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 1949 Third
Geneva Convention].
3. Judge Takao Inamari originally drafted the Court's reasons, but he was trans-
ferred to another post before the closing session of the Court. See Kamibayashi, 29
I.L.M. at 393 (introductory note).
.4. Id. at 396. The Court uses "effective date" as an ambiguous term. It is referred
to as the date on which the 1949 Third Geneva Convention "goes into force" for a
particular State, pursuant to Article 140. See, e.g., Judicial Decisions, supra note 1, at
128. In addition "effective date" is also used to denote the date on which the Conven-
tion becomes applicable between two States, pursuant to Article 2. See, e.g.,
Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 403. The "effective date", here, refers to the date on which
the Convention took effect between the POW's Home Country and the Detaining
Power.
5. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 434. Judge Kinoshita stated:
[I]t can not be maintained that a rule of customary international law which is
the same as appeared in Articles 66 and 68 of the 1949 Convention has been
established by the end of the Second World War or after the War and before
formulation of the 1949 [Third Geneva] Convention when the Plaintiffs had
been interned in [the] Soviet Union.
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tomary international law.'
While injured POWs from the Persian Gulf War will not be af-
fected by this decision, the Kamabayashi court sends a harsh message
to injured POWs who are not able to avail themselves of favorable pro-
visions of conventional law: customary international law does not re-
quire the Power of Origin to compensate its own POWs for unpaid
wages or for injuries after repatriation.7 Consequently, injured plain-
tiffs lose twice. This note concludes that, although the Court was cor-
rect in dismissing the POWs' claim against their own government for
wages after World War I1,1 the Court should have held the Power of
Origin liable for compensation of injuries persisting after the POWs'
repatriation on the basis of customary international law.,
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 2, 1945, Japan officially proclaimed its uncondi-
tional surrender to China, Great Britain, the United States and the
Soviet Union (Allied Powers).1" Additionally, Japan accepted the terms
of surrender that were set forth by the Allied. Powers on July 26, 1945
in the Declaration of Potsdam. 1 One of the provisions of the Potsdam
Proclamation provided for "[t]he Japanese military forces, after being
completely disarmed, [to] be permitted to return to their homes with
the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives." 12 All of the Al-
lied Powers, except the Soviet Union, followed this provision and Japa-
nese POWs were repatriated as soon as transportation to Japan became
available.13 As a result, almost all of the Japanese POWs were repatri-
ated by 1947.14
6. See infra notes 188-201 and accompanying text.
7. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 436.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 135-40.
9. See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
10. Instrument of Surrender of Japan, Tokyo, September 2, 1945, 59 Stat. 1733,
E.A.S. 493, 3 Bevans 1251.
1l. Id.
12. Declaration of Potsdam, July 26, 1945, 1945 For. Rel. 1474, 3 Bevans 1204,
1205.
13. H. Levie, Opinion of Professor Howard S. Levie With Respect to the Claim
Against the Government of Japan Made by Former Members of the Japanese Military
Forces Unlawfully Detained as Prisoners of War in Siberia, Central Asia, or Else-
where, by the Soviet Union Long After the Termination of the Hostilities in World
War II 26 (1983) (Professor Emeritus at St. Louis University School of Law) [herein-
after Opinion of Professor Levie]. Professor Levie prepared this opinion in order to
advise the plaintiffs prior to the Tokyo District Court's decision.
14. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 392.
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Approximately 600,000 Japanese soldiers fell into the custody of
the Soviet Union at the end of World War I1.'" Many of these captives
were illegally detained for three to thirteen years after the termination
of hostilities.16 Those detained were transferred to. POW and labor
camps in Siberia, the Arctic Region, and the remote districts of the
Ural Mountains."' In addition to the Soviet Union's violation of the
Potsdam Declaration, the Soviet Union improperly treated the Japa-
nese POWs. The POWs were not provided with adequate food, cloth-
ing, work safeguards, or medical supplies. 18 Consequently, many were
killed or injured because of malnutrition, lack of rest, severe cold, and
infectious diseases. 9 Moreover, they were subject to strenuous labor
and unattainable production quotas, and they received little, if any,
working pay. 20 By signing the Joint Declaration in 1956,21 however, the
Japanese Government made it impossible for Japan as a State, or its
nationals as individuals, to make any claims against the Soviet Union.
22
The Soviet Union did not complete repatriation of POWs until
1958.23 Of the 600,000 Japanese POWs detained in the Soviet Union,
about 500,000 returned home to Japan.2 4 To date, approximately
200,000 are still alive but many suffer from social oppression, discrimi-
nation, and physical and mental handicaps.25 On April 13, 1981,26
sixty-two former POWs, who had been interned in the Soviet Union,
filed suit against the Japanese Government to receive compensation for
wages (payment of credit balances) and work-related injuries, as well
as to receive compensation for other Soviet violations.2 7 The plaintiffs
sought total compensation of 264,100,000 yen. 28 Their claims were
15. Id. at 391.
16. Id. at 392.
17. Id. at 391.
18. Id.
19. Judicial Decisions, supra note 1, at 126.
20. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 392.
21. Joint Declaration of October 19, 1956, Japan-Soviet Union, 263 U.N.T.S. 99.
22. See Id. at art. 6, para. 2.
23. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 392. However, all of the Japanese POW plaintiffs
in this case, with the exception of two plaintiffs who are not considered in this note, had
been repatriated prior to November 10, 1954. Judicial Decisions, supra note 1, at 128.
See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (explaining the importance of this detail
in relation to the issue of retroactivity of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention).
24. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 392.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 400. This case note concentrates solely on the plaintiffs' claims for
compensation of wages and compensation for injuries.
28. Id. at 392. Using the exchange rate for April 13, 1981, this is equivalent to
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based in international law, specifically relating to the provisions of the
1949 Third Geneva Convention and customary international law, as
well as in domestic law, relating to provisions of the Japanese Constitu-
tion and the Japanese National Compensation Law. 9
Court proceedings continued for eight years and on April 18,
1989, the Tokyo District Court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims,
both domestic and international. 0 The plaintiffs filed for an appeal on
May 1, 1981,1 and the Tokyo District Court's decision is currently
pending appellate review.
III. DETERMINING THE LAW APPLICABLE TO REPATRIATED POWs
A. Conventional Law
The Kamibayashi decision emphasizes an important issue of tim-
ing that courts must consider when, applying conventional law: when
the facts of a case occur prior to the effective date of an international
agreement, are its relevant provisions retroactive? 2 If the court finds
that the agreement's provisions are not retroactive, it must then deter-
mine the law that applies to the case. 3
1. Solving the Issue of Retroactivity
During and after World War II, most belligerents were governed
by the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War (1929 Geneva Convention). 34" Although neither Japan nor the
approximately 56,807,910,000 American dollars. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 13, 1981,
at 36 (listing the exchange rate at 215.10 yen per U.S. dollar).
29. See Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 392.
30. Id. at 393.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 402-03 (recognizing the issue of retroactivity); see also Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 28, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 8
I.L.M. 679 (addressing the issue of retroactivity) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
33. It is only logical for a court, once it determines that particular provisions of a
convention do not apply to a given case, to define the law that is available to decide the
case at hand. See Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 407 (After ruling that Articles 66 and 68
of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention were not retroactive, the court proceeded to
determine the law available).
34. See Judicial Decisions, supra note 1, at 127. See also Rundell, Paying the
POW in World War II, 22 MILITARY AFFAIRS 121 (1958) (stating that it was provi-
sions of the 1929 Geneva Convention that applied to the results of World War II)
[hereinafter Rundell].
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Soviet Union were parties to the Convention, 5 in 1942 Japan expressed
her willingness to be bound by its provisions.3 6 The POW payment pro-
vision in the 1929 Geneva Convention required, in effect, that the De-
taining Power3 7 satisfy credit balances of POWs upon their termination
from captivity until (or unless) otherwise agreed upon by the belliger-
ents." It also required the Detaining Power to compensate POWs for
work-related injuries after their repatriation.3 9
Shortly thereafter, the 1949 Third Geneva Convention required
the Power of Origin to compensate POWs for accrued wages and work-
related injuries persisting after repatriation.4 Both Japan and the So-
viet Union ratified the 1949 Third Geneva Convention."' The plaintiffs
based their claim for compensation on the provisions of this most recent
Convention.4 2 As the Tokyo District Court ruled, however, there was a
problem of timing that prevented the plaintiffs from prevailing on this
claim.43
According to Article 140 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention,
accessions to the Convention take effect six months after they are re-
ceived.44 Japan acceded on April 21, 195341 and the Convention thus
entered into force for Japan from October 21 of the same year.46 The
Soviet Union, however, did not accede to the 1949 Third Geneva Con-
vention until November 10, 1954.4' Therefore, the Convention did not
become effective for the Soviet Union until May 10, 1955.48 Although
35. H. LEVIE, PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 216 n. 13
(1979) [hereinafter LEVIE].
36. Id. at 217.
37. The Detaining Power refers to the State holding the POW in captivity.
38. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July
27, 1929, art. 34, 47 Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846; 118 L.N.T.S. 343 [hereinafter 1929
Geneva Convention].
39. See id. at art. 27. See also LEVIE, supra note 35, at 250 (stating that Article
27 of the 1929 Geneva Convention was redrafted because former Detaining Powers
were not following its mandate after repatriation).
40. See 1949 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2, arts. 66 & 68.
41. See Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 403: "[Bloth Japan and Soviet Union acceded
to the Convention. Then, it is clear that the 1949 Convention is applicable to all cases
of declared war or any other armed conflict between Japan and Soviet Union." Id.
42. See id. at 400.
43. Id. at 403.
44. 1949 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 140.
45. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 401.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (giving the guidelines for calculat-
ing the effective date).
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Japan's effective date was before that of the Soviet Union's, Japan did
not become bound to the 1949 Geneva Convention's provisions vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union until November 10, 1954, the date on which the So-
viet Union acceded to the Convention.49
In Kamibayashi, the plaintiffs had all been repatriated before this
"magic date," November 10, 1954.80 Thus, one issue on appeal is
whether Articles 66 and 68 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention can
apply retroactively to the plaintiffs' case.-1
Article 28 of another international agreement, the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, 2 directly addresses this issue of retroactiv-
ity. It provides that:
[U]nless a different intention appears from the treaty or is oth-
erwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation
to an act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased
to exist before the date of entry into force of the treaty with
regard to that party. 3
As a general rule, therefore, a treaty does not apply retroactively unless
a contrary procedure is (1) stated in the treaty itself, or, is (2) intended
by the contracting parties.
54
The only article in the 1949 Third Geneva Convention which re-
fers to the issue of retroactivity is Article 141. It provides that the Con-
vention will apply to armed conflicts and wars before, as well as after, a
49. See 1949 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 2. The relevant part of
Article 2 reads:
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in
their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in
relation to said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof.
Id. (emphasis added). The Soviet Union did not become a "mutual" party with Japan
until November 10, 1954. The last sentence of Article 2 does not bind Japan to the
Convention in its relations with the Soviet Union until this date. See also supra note 4
(explaining the ambiguous meaning of the term "effective date").
50. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 403.
51. Id. at 403: "[T]he question remains whether provisions of these Articles shall
apply to those who have lost their status as prisoners of war before the effective date of
the Convention." Id.
52. Vienna Convention, supra note 32.
53. Id.
54. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 403 (explaining the rule established by Article 28
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
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State's ratification or accession."5 The Article says nothing about how
the Convention will apply to repatriation that is completed before rati-
fication or accession.5 6
The Tokyo District Court interpreted the 1949 Third Geneva Con-
vention's silence on this point as a denial of retroactivity of Articles 66
and 68." While this may appear to be a conservative interpretation of
the treaty, it is actually required by the language of Article 28 of the
Vienna Convention. Silence can not be construed as an "intention ...
[of] the treaty"" permitting non-application of the general principle
which prohibits retroactivity. 9
The Court also held that an intent of the contracting parties to
apply Articles 66 and 68 retroactively could not be ascertained. 0
Therefore, "[retroactivity] was not [and could not be] otherwise estab-
lished. '61 Since most POWs after World War II had been repatriated
by 1947,62 it can be assumed that contracting parties to the 1949 Third
Geneva Convention were well aware of the fact that Articles 66 and
68, providing the POWs with compensation from the Power of Origin,
would not apply to most of the POWS of World War II.63 Notwith-
standing the Vienna Convention's general principle of non-retroactiv-
ity,64 the Court concluded that the contracting parties would have ex-
plicitly provided for retroactivity of these Articles if they had so
intended.6"
The Court reasoned that if the plaintiffs had been detained until
November 10, 1954, they could have reaped the benefits of compensa-
tion from the Power of Origin provided in Articles 66 and 68.68 The
timing of their release from captivity, however, precluded the plaintiffs
from invoking provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention. 7
55. See 1949 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 141.
56. See id. See also Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 404.
57. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 404.
58. Vienna Convention, supra note 32.
59. The language of Article 28 dictates this conclusion. See id.
60. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 405.
61. Vienna Convention, supra note 32.
62. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
63. See generally Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 404-05 (stating that German, Brit-
ish, French, and most Japanese POWs who were captive in the Soviet Union had been
repatriated before 1949).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
65. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 405.
66. By that time, the 1949 Third Geneva Convention would have taken effect be-
tween Japan and the Soviet Union. Id. at 396.
67. Id.
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2. Determing the Law When Desired Provisions are Non-
Retroactive
Prior to ratification of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention, the
conventional law relating to POWs that was applicable to Japan in-
cluded the 1929 Geneva Convention 8 and its predecessor, the 1907
Hague Convention IV With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War
on Land (1907 Hague Regulations)." The Soviet Union, which never
ratified the 1929 Geneva Convention, was a party only to the 1907
Hague Regulations.7" Neither of these conventions, however, provided
for the form of compensation sought by the plaintiffs.
The 1907 Hague Regulations placed the responsibility for the pay-
ment of credit balances of POWs after repatriation on the Detaining
Power. 71 The 1929 Geneva Convention provided for the same, absent a
contrary agreement by the belligerents. 72 Notwithstanding the fact that
the Soviet Union was not a party to the 1929 Geneva Convention, no
agreement on the payment of POW credit balances upon repatriation
was ever made between Japan and the Soviet Union. 73 Therefore, the
Soviet Union, as the Detaining Power, was required to pay POW wage
balances when captivity ceased.74
With regard to compensating injuries after repatriation, the 1929
Geneva Convention required the former Detaining Power to provide for
continued payment of repatriated POWs under its domestic worker's
compensation system.75 Because the Soviet Union was not a party to
the 1929 Geneva Convention and this provision could not be imposed
68. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
69. See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RES-
OLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 96 (D. Schindler and J. Toman, eds. 1988) (listing
Japan as a party to the 1907 Hague Convention) [hereinafter ARMED CONFLICTS].
70. See Id. at 97 n.1 (indicating the Soviet Union's ratification of the 1907 Hague
Convention). See also supra note 35 (stating that the Soviet Union was not a party to
the 1929 Geneva Convention).
71. Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
(with Annexed Regulations), October 18, 1907, art. 6, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539,
Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations].
72. See 1929 Geneva Convention, supra note 38, art. 34.
73. See LEVIE, supra note 35, at 202 (stating that no agreements with regard to
wages were ever made between belligerents during World War II, with the-exception of
a limited agreement between Italy and the United States in 1942).
74. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 71. All Detaining Powers, including
those subject to the 1929 Geneva Convention who did not otherwise agree, were re-
quired to pay accrued wages to POWs upon repatriation.
75. Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 59. See also 1929 Geneva Con-
vention, supra note 38, art. 27.
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on it as a matter of customary international law, 76 the 1907 Hague
Regulations governed the plaintiffs' claim for compensation of work-
related injuries." Unfortunately, these regulations did not address com-
pensation of work-related injuries. 7 Therefore, the prevailing law of
international conventions did not require Japan, the Power of Origin, to
compensate her nationals for work-related injuries upon repatriation. 9
Without any applicable conventional law to support their claims
against the Japanese Government, the plaintiffs' only hope for any re-
covery based on international law depended on the existence of custom-
ary international law.8 0
B. Customary International Law
1. Elements Required
If the Court had found that Articles 66 and 68 of the Third Ge-
neva Convention were a codification of prevailing customary law, the
legal requirement set forth in the articles would have been applied to
the plaintiffs in Kamibayashi.81 Custom is a source of international law
in itself, separate from conventional law, that courts are required to
apply when settling disputes.82 Therefore, even without the retroactivity
76. See infra notes 162-67 and accompanying text (explaining that the mandate
of Article 27 is not a matter of customary international law).
77. See ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 69, at 339. The 1929 Geneva Convention
did not replace, but rather, only complimented provisions of the 1907 Hague Regula-
tions. For the States that did not ratify the 1929 Convention, the 1907 Hague Regula-
tions continued to govern. See id.
78. LEVIE, supra note 35, at 249.
79. See Id.
80. After rejecting the applicability of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention to the
plaintiffs' case, the Court then considered the mandates of customary international law.
See Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 407. Customary international law, here, refers to the
law that had been established by the end of World War II and before formulation of
the 1949 Third Geneva Convention when the plaintiffs had completed repatriation. See
generally supra note 5.
81. Cf. THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIME COMMISSION, XII LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 88 (a reproduction of United States v. Wilhelm von
Leeb). The court upheld a prior decision of the International Military Tribunal and
accepted as international law that "the [1929] Geneva Convention was not binding as
between Germany and Russia as a contractual agreement but that the general princi-
ples of international law as outlined in those conventions were applicable." Id. at 534.
In the case at bar, it would follow that, although the 1949 Geneva Convention was not
binding as a contractual agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union at the time of
the plaintiffs' repatriation, the general principles of international law as outlined in that
Convention were still applicable. See id.
82. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 (1945); R. MILLER, THE
KAMIBAYASHI v. JAPAN
of Articles 66 and 68, the Japanese Government could have been held
liable for compensation to its nationals for wages and injuries after re-
patriation if such compensation was otherwise required as a matter of
customary international law. 3
Article 38 (1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice defines "international custom" as "evidence of a general practice
accepted as law.' From this definition, the Tokyo District Court cor-
rectly recognized that there were two distinct elements necessary to
prove the existence of customary law with regard to compensation by
the Power of Origin: (1) "general practice"; and (2) "accept[ance] as
law", often referred to as opinio juris.86 In order for customary inter-
national law to hold Japan liable for compensation, the plaintiffs had to
show that nations, in general, were providing compensation for wages
and injuries after repatriation to their own nationals by the end of
World War II and at the time that the plaintiffs completed repatria-
tion. The plaintiffs also had to establish that the nations were moti-
vated to provide such compensation by a sense of legal obligation.8
2. Codifications
Since the mid-nineteenth century, attempts were made to codify
customary laws of war that related to POWs." Lieber's Instructions
for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber
Instructions) 88 in 1863 were the first attempt at such a codification. 89
Although the Lieber Instructions only had binding force on the United
States, they corresponded to the customs of war existing at the time
and strongly influenced further codifications.9" The Brussels Convention
LAW OF WAR 9 (1975) (stating that "customary law continues to exist side by side
with treaty [conventional] law .... ); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900) (discussing the need for courts to take judicial notice of customary law).
83. See generally Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 (1945).
84. Id.
85. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 426 (quotations are taken from Article 38, which
the court is discussing).
86. See R. MILLER, THE LAW OF WAR 10 (1975). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1986): "Custom-
ary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation."
87. See LEVIE, supra note 35, at 213-218 (discussing the history of labor provi-
sions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention).
88. Armed Conflicts, supra note 69, at 3 (reproduction of the document itself).
89. Id. (introductory note) at 3.
90. Id.
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of 1874,91 though never ratified, 92 and the 1880 Oxford Manual9" rep-
resented other important steps in the movement for codification of the
laws of war.94 Moreover, the 1907 Hague Convention 95 was found to be
"declaratory of the laws and customs of war." 96
Selected provisions of a Convention can also be viewed as a codifi-
cation of custom. For example, in United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb
(The High Command Case),97 the United States Military Tribunal
enumerated specific articles of the 1929 Geneva Convention which rep-
resented customary international law. 98 In so doing, it provided that the
enumerated articles were binding on a nation that was not a party to
the Convention "insofar as they were in substance an expression of
international law as accepted by the civilized nations of the World
"99
Consequently, any article of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention,
standing alone, could be interpreted as a declaratory provision codified
in the law. 10 0 The Tokyo District Court erred in its analysis of custom-
ary international Law by failing to consider this possibility. The
Kamabayashi court examined custom with regard to both Articles 66
and 68 together, under a unified "Principle of Compensation by the
State of the Origin" when it held that neither article codified cus-
tom.103 Instead, the Court should have analyzed each article indepen-
dently to determine whether either article standing alone represented a
codification of existing customary law. Had the Court made a separate
analysis of each article, it would have held that Article 68 codified pre-
vailing customary law.
91. Id. at 25.
92. Id. (introductory note) at 25.
93. Id. at 35.
94. Id. at 25.
95. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 71.
96. ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 69, at 3 (citing from an excerpt on judicial
decisions in 41 A.J.I.L. 248-49); See also, THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIME COMMIS-
SION, XII LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 87 (1949) [hereinafter LAW
REPORTS] (stating that the Hague Convention was "declaratory of existing Interna-
tional Law").
97. LAW REPORTS, supra note 96.
98. Id. Among those enumerated, were Articles 2, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 29, 32, 46
and 50. Id.; See also Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 15.
99. LAW REPORTS, supra note 96, at 88.
100. Specifically enumerated articles of a Convention can represent customary
law. See Id.
101. See Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 407.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Payment of Credit Balances & Article 66
1. The Obligation to Pay Wages
The Lieber Code, the earliest codification dealing with prisoner-of-
war labor, did not provide for any type of wage payments to POWs.1"2
Historically, belligerents were reluctant to utilize POW labor. 103 By
providing that POWs "may be required to work for the benefit of the
captor's government," 10' the Lieber Code attempted to overcome this
reluctance. Since there was little, if any, practice of POW employ-
ment,"0 5 no wage-payment custom developed at that time.
By 1874, Article 25 of the Brussels Declaration10 6 provided for the
Detaining Power to pay wages to POWs during their detainment "to-
wards improving their position' 10 7 or on their release. 1 8 Six years later,
Article 72 of the Oxford Manual placed the same responsibility on the
Detaining Power. 09 Again, and more plainly, Article 6 of the 1907
Hague Regulations obligated the Detaining Power to assume any wage
credit balance (after deducting the cost of maintenance) when POW
captivity terminated.110 These early codifications, from the 1874 Brus-
sels Conference through the 1907 Hague Convention, show a growing
international recognition of the obligation on the captor state to satisfy
POW credit balances. 11
Article 34 of the 1929 Geneva Convention, which was applicable
to most POWs who were released from captivity after World War
102. See ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 69, at 3 (reviewing the articles of the
Lieber Code shows that no wage-payment provision was included).
103. See LEVIE, supra note 35, at 214.
104. ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 69 at 13 (citing Article 76 of the Lieber
Code).
105. LEVIE, supra note 35, at 214.
106. ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 69, at 25 (providing a reproduction of the
Brussels Declaration).
107. Id. at 30.
108. Id.
109. See ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 69, at 46 (reproducing. the Manual).
110. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 71, art. 6.
111. During World War I, which was governed by the 1907 Hague Regulations,
the United States and Germany entered into an agreement concerning POWs. Article
51 of that agreement specifies the amount of wages owed by the captor state. See
Agreement between the United States of America and Germany Concerning Prisoners
of War, Sanitary Personnel, and Civilians, Berne, November 11, 1918, 224 Parry, Con-
solidated Treaty Series 231, quoted in DOCUMENTS ON PRISONERS OF WAR 115 (H.
Levie ed. 1979) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS].
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11,112 left the manner in which POWs were to collect wages up to the
agreement of the belligerents. 1 3 Absent such agreements, however,
compensation for work performed for the Detaining Power was to be
based on a formula similar to that set out in Article 6 of the 1907
Hague Regulations. The Detaining Power credited wages to the POW's
account during captivity, but payment of the credit balances had to be
remitted to the POW upon his release.""4 With the exception of the
Italio-American Agreement of December 1941 to June 1942, no agree-
ments between belligerents as required by the 1929 Geneva Convention
were ever concluded. 1 5 Consequently, the payment procedure in Arti-
cle 6 of the Hague Regulations applied in both World Wars I and II
with regard to the payment of credit balances.' 16 The Detaining Power
continued to be responsible for paying the credit balances of POWs on
their release.
Few Detaining Powers actually complied with the requirement of
satisfying credit balances of POWs upon their repatriation. 17 A reason
frequently cited for the Detaining Powers' non-compliance was the ex-
istence of import and export controls on foreign currency and the re-
sulting fear that an influx of foreign currency could create a black mar-
ket in the territories of the Powers of Origin of the returning POWs." 8
Another reason cited for non-compliance was that non-victors of the
war were sometimes left in such poor financial and administrative con-
dition that they could not afford to pay their former POWs." 9 Never-
theless, the law only obligated the Detaining Power to compensate
POWs for work performed in captivity.'
112. See supra note 34.
113. See 1929 Geneva Convention, supra note 38.
114. See id.
115. LEVIE, supra note 35, at 202.
116. Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 131.
117. See LEvIE, supra note 35, at 216: "[Mlany of the protective provisions of the
1929 Convention (and of the 1907 Hague Regulations which it complemented) were
either grossly distorted or simply disregarded." See also Rundell, supra note 34, at 121
in which the United States is compared to Axis Powers, who "were not so meticulous in
following the provisions of the treaty when paying American prisoners of war." Id.
118. See Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 134. See also Final Record
of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. IIA, § 548 (recognizing the
problem caused by import or export restrictions imposed by most States) [hereinafter
Final Record].
119. See Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 139 (referring to nations in
such a position as "vanquished").
120. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 416-422. The Tokyo District Court refers to a
few States, including the United States and the United Kingdom, which took it upon
themselves to compensate their own nationals for accrued wages. In particular, see id.
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Great Britain and Germany entered into a unique agreement as an
attempt to alleviate such problems. The agreement required each of the
parties to settle the accounts of their own nationals who had been cap-
tive in the other's territory.12' In essence, it provided for the Power of
Origin to compensate its own nationals. 22 However, this agreement
was never enforced because of Germany's inability to compensate its
own nationals after its unconditional surrender in World War II.123
Knowing that the International Committee of the Red Cross12 would
take action on behalf of the unpaid German POWs, Great Britain did
not seek strict enforcement of the agreement, but adopted another pol-
icy to provide German POWs payment without delay." 5 Similarly, the
United States and France provided payment of credit balances for Ger-
man POWs.released by them.' 26 The obligation to pay credit balances
once again landed on the Detaining Power. Many German POWs held
in France, Great Britain and the United States were fortunate enough
to obtain payment of wages from the Detaining Power.127 These fortu-
nate POWs, however, represented only a small minority of all the indi-
viduals held as POWs during and after World War 11.128
2. Article 66 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention: Shifting the
Obligation
Because most Detaining Powers did not compensate POWs for
their labor, conferences which culminated in the 1949 Third Geneva
Convention considered shifting the responsibility of paying POW credit
balances onto the Power of Origin.' 29 No firm agreement to adopt this
change was made in the early conferences. As a result, the Stockholm
at 423-26, where the Court emphasized that, although Japan compensated Japanese
POWs who had been repatriated from Australia, New Zealand, Southeast Asia, and
the United States, she did so under the instruction of the General Headquarters, not
under an obligation of international law.
121. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS ON ITS ACTIVITIES DURING THE SECOND
WORLD WAR, Vol. I, 286-289 (1948) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE ICRC].
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an internationally
recognized protective agency that takes action on behalf of POWs. For a discussion of
the history and significance of the ICRC, see LEVIE, supra note 35, at 307-311.
125. See REPORT 0 THE ICRC, supra note 121.
126. Id.
127. Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 136.
128. Id.
129. See Final Record, supra note 118, § 282.
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draft 30 continued to contain the 1929 Geneva Convention's provision,
namely, "that the credit balance should be paid in cash by the Detain-
ing Power."'31 Some delegations to the Third Geneva Convention in-
sisted that the provision in the Stockholm draft, like the provision in
Article 34 of the 1929 Convention, should be left unchanged.1 32 Other
delegations thought that the Detaining Power and the Power of Origin
should have joint responsibility for settling credit balances on the
POW's release. 33 This points to the fact that when POWs of World
War II were released from captivity and repatriated, the applicable in-
ternational law continued to place the legal obligation for settling
credit balances on the Detaining Power.'
Article 66 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention, which requires
the Power of Origin to settle any credit balance of a POW's account, 135
was a "new" conventional provision' 3 6 that was not itself mandated by
customary international law.' 37 Prior to the 1949 Third Geneva Con-
130. The Stockholm draft resulted after two years of preliminary conferences as
to the provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention and was adopted by the ICRC
in 1948. See DOCUMENTS, supra note 111, at 422.
131. Final Record, supra note 121, §282. There was still no agreement to the
effect that the Power of Origin should be obligated to bear the burden of settling its
nationals' credit balances. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
132. See Final Record, supra note 118, § 548 in which General Parker of the U.S.
is quoted: "[T]he purpose of the Convention was to ensure the protection of the prison-
ers' interests rather than those of their Government." Id.
133. Id. at § 4.
134. See generally, Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 139.
135. See LEVIE, supra note 35, at 205 (explaining that the third paragraph of
Article 66 places the responsibility on the Power of Origin and not the Detaining power
to settle any certified balance of the POW's account).
136. Article 66 was a "new" conventional provision in the sense that it established
a requirement that was never before mandated in conventional law:
Under the rule of the 1907 Hague Regulations and of the 1929 Geneva Pris-
oner-of-War Convention, the Detaining Power had this primary responsibility
[to pay POW credit balances] and if it failed to meet that responsibility, for
whatever reason, it was guilty of an international dereliction. Now [under
Article 66 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention] the Power of Origin has
this responsibility and if it fails to meet that responsibility, for whatever rea-
son, including lack of domestic legislation, it is guilty of an international
dereliction.
Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 141.
137. Id. at 154-55. Although some States may have paid the credit balances of
repatriated members of their armed forces that were detained in another belligerent's
territory, "there [was] not, and there could not [have been], any international obliga-
tion in this respect, which [was] a matter of domestic custom and law." Id. (emphasis
added).
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vention, any Powers which paid their own repatriated nationals"'8 could
not be said to have acted under a sense of international obligation
(opinio juris). Making such payments would have purely been a matter
of domestic custom or law.1 9
Based on this reasoning, the Japanese Government could not have
been liable for compensation of credit balances of its repatriated na-
tionals under the customary international law that existed before the
1949 Third Geneva Convention and at the time the plaintiffs were re-
leased from the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Tokyo District Court was
correct in holding that customary international law did not support the
plaintiffs' claim for compensation of wages from the Japanese Govern-
ment, the Power of Origin. Customary international law required the
Detaining Power, in this case the Soviet Union, to satisfy the plaintiffs'
credit balances. The Soviet Union's failure in this regard violated cus-
tomary international law. 4"
B. Compensation for Injuries & Article 68
1. The 1907 Hague Regulations: Custom Rules
Early codifications of customary international law did not provide
any guidance as to. which belligerent, the Detaining Power or the
Power of Origin, should provide compensation to POWs who sustained
work-related injuries.' 4 The 1907 Hague Regulations which governed
the conduct of belligerents during World War I were also silent on this
problem.' 42 Necessarily, belligerents had to enter into ad-hoc agree-
ments to address this and other deficiencies in the 1907 Hague
Regulations. 4 '
138. See, e.g., supra note 120.
139. See supra note 137. While this case note only concerns itself with interna-
tional custom and law, see source cited at supra note 1 for information on domestic law
in Japan.
Having established that the burden to satisfy credit balances rests on the Detain-
ing Power, there is a lingering question as to whether or not Japan is vicariously liable
for the Soviet Union's failure in this regard. See Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note
13, at 160 (explaining that this is an issue of domestic law).
140. Note, however, that Japan absolved the Soviet Union from liability by sign-
ing the Joint Declaration. See supra text accompanying note 22.
141. See generally, ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 69, at 3-48 (reproducing all of
the provisions of the Lieber Instructions, the Brussels's Convention, and the Oxford
Manual, none of which contain any mention of the compensation for injury).
142. See LEVIE, supra note 35, at 249.
143. See Kamibayashi, .29 I.L.M. at 411. See also DOCUMENTS, supra note 111,
at 86.
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The Tokyo District Court analyzed two such agreements: (1) the
1918 Agreement between the British and German Governments Con-
cerning Prisoners of War and Civilians (UK-Germany Agreement),
and (2) the 1918 Agreement between the United States of America
and Germany Concerning Combatant Prisoners of War, Sanitary Per-
sonnel, and Civilians (US-Germany Agreement). 14 4 Both Article 32 of
the UK-Germany Agreement 145 and Article 92 of the US-Germany
Agreement 146 stated that the Detaining Power merely had to provide
the injured POW with a certificate upon his release. The injured POW
was then to present his certificate to the Power of Origin in making a
claim against that Power for work-related injuries.147 These agree-
ments, which placed the final responsibility on the Power of Origin to
compensate its own nationals for injuries after repatriation, "repre-
sented the customary practice of States at a time when they were sub-
ject solely to the 1907 Hague Regulations in their treatment of prison-
ers of war." 148
Prior to these agreements, the 1917 Copenhagen Convention" 9
had adopted the "Russian Proposal,"' 150 which required the Detaining
Power to provide for injured POWs in the same manner as it provided
for its own injured citizens.1 5' The procedure called for by the Russian
Proposal, however, was contrary to general practice and customary law.
Subsequent agreements between belligerents, as discussed above, re-
jected the approach taken in the Russian proposal. In addition, the
problems created by Article 27 of the 1929 Geneva Convention, which
adopted the Russian proposal, proved that this procedure was confusing
and radically departed from prevailing practices.1 52
2. Article 27 of the 1929 Geneva Convention: The Unworkable
Requirement
Article 27 of the 1929 Geneva Convention, which governed most
144. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 411-12.
145. The Hague, July 14, 1918, Parl. Papers, Misc No. 20 (1918); 111 BFSP 279.
146. Bern, November 11, 1918, [1918] For. Rel. U.S., The World War, Supp. 2,
at 103 (1933); 13 A.J.I.L. Supp. 1.
147. See Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 58-59.
148. Id.
149. Arrangements concernant les prisonniers de guerre entre l'Allemagne,
l'Autriche-Hongrie, la Roumanie, la Russie, et la Turquie, Copenhague, November 2,
1917, Archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (in French).
150. See LEvIE, supra note 35, at 249.
151. Id.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 153-67.
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belligerents during World War II, attempted to bring the repatriated
POW under the worker's compensation system of the Detaining
Power.1"3 Great confusion arose when States tried to carry out this pro-
vision. For example, only after "elaborate negotiations with the United
Kingdom"' 4 did Germany manage to pass special legislation to imple-
ment this procedure. 155 The United States also had to alter its prevail-
ing legislation in order to establish a similar policy for providing com-
pensation to POWs under its domestic insurance regulations. 56
The United Kingdom, concluded, after "lengthy negotiations [with
Germany and Italy] as to the correct meaning of Article 27,"'15 that
"its domestic Worker's Compensation legislation was too complex and
so bound up with the conditions of free civilian workers as to make it
impracticable to apply it to prisoners of war."' 58 The British govern-
ment viewed its obligation under Article 27 as simply a requirement to
provide the injured POW with all necessary medical attention, cloth-
ing, food, and accommodations during the POW's internment. This was
thought to be equivalent to the types of benefits received by injured
British workers.1 59 No compensation payments were provided to repa-
triated POWs by the United Kingdom. 6 ' The United Kingdom's prac-
tice reflected the general policy that States actually carried out during
World War 11.161
The lengthy, elaborate and sometimes unsuccessful 6 2 negotiations
that were necessary to interpret the correct meaning of Article 27, as
well as the need to enact special legislation in order to comply with the
article,6 3 indicated that Article 27's mandate was contrary to the cus-
tomary international law that prevailed at the time.6 Obvious efforts
to eradicate Article 27 further demonstrated that Article 27 (and the
Russian Proposal) did not conform with prevailing customary interna-
153. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
154. Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L 360, 373 (1952).
155. Id.
156. See LEVIE, supra note 35, at 250.
157. Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 61 (citing United Kingdom
War Office, The Law of War on Land, #185 n.1 (1958)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 157-58 (illustrating that the United
Kingdom could not reach an agreement).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
164. See Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 59.
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tional law.
Before 1947, the International Red Cross explicitly reported that
Article 27 of the 1929 Geneva Convention was "inapplicable in prac-
tice [when] the effect of the accident extended beyond repatriation of
[the] POW."'1 65 The Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Ge-
neva of 1949 later re-emphasized that the compensation system de-
scribed in Article 27 was "impossible to apply in practice. ' 166 More-
over, despite the stipulation of Article 27, no payments were ever
actually made to injured POWs by.the former Detaining Powers after
the POWs' repatriation. 16 7
3. General Practice
Throughout World Wars I and II, the Power of Origin compen-
sated POWs for injury after repatriation even without a certificate
from the Detaining Power. In the United States, statutes have been
enacted since 1789 which provided for payment of pensions for those
injured in its military forces during war.' 68 Currently, the Wartime
Disability Compensation Act provides such relief for members of the
U.S. armed forces who are "released under conditions other than dis-
honorable,"'6 9 which includes injured POWs who were repatriated.
Great Britain also enacted various statutes on the subject since the
nineteenth century. 70 The British Royal Warrant of May 24, 1949
provides compensation for injuries to any member of the British mili-
tary forces who suffers from an industrial accident while a POW.' 7'
Similarly, France has compensated its injured nationals who were
POWs since at least 1831. "' The Tokyo District Court specifically
cited the Laws of April 11, 1831 and of April 18, 1831, which created
165. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE WORK OF
THE CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS FOR THE STUDY OF THE CONVENTIONS
FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS, Geneva, April 14-26, 1947, at 173-74 (Series
I, 5B) [hereinafter REPORT OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS].
166. Final Record, supra note 118, at 55 (setting forth the statement of Mr.
Gardner from the United Kingdom).
167. See LEVIE, supra note 35, at 250.
168. See Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 156 where it is stated that
the First Session of the First Congress of the United States enacted such a statute in
1789 (1 United States Stat. at Large 95).
169. 38 U.S.C. § 310 (1979).
170. Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 157.
171. Id., citing CONGRESS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS, SURVEY
OF BENEFITS GRANTED TO VETERANS BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES 479 (1960) [hereinafter
SURVEY OF BENEFITS].
172. See Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 417.
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pension systems for French military personnel. 17 3 The French Law of
March 31, 1919, which applied retroactively, limited the scope of com-
pensation to cases of illness and injury. This French Law was supple-
mented by the Law of June 24, 1919, which also compensated civilian
victims of war.174 After World War II, France promulgated a compre-
hensive codification of law related to compensating former POWs from
France. There are presently four different kinds of compensation avail-
able for former POWs of French origin. 7 5
Germany provides disability compensation payments for those in-
jured during wartime military service, which is defined to include "time
of imprisonment or internment."1 6 The Kamibayashi court specifically
cited three laws that provided assistance and compensation to German
POWs and were enacted after World War II: the law concerning liveli-
hood assistance to the families of prisoners of war (June 13, 1950), the
law concerning aid to repatriated soldiers of West Germany (June 19,
1950), and the law concerning compensation to former German prison-
ers of war (January 30, 1954).' 71
Canada has also compensated its nationals. Since 1946, Canadian
law granted pensions to all former POWs who had been detained in
Japan.' " The Compensation for Former Prisoners of War Act, enacted
on May 5, 1976, expanded the scope of compensation to include former
POWs that had been held captive in other States."7 9
The Tokyo District Court, in addition, mentioned that Austria
compensated its injured nationals who were POWs through the 1957
Austrian War Victims Aid Act and the 1958 Austrian Federal Law
concerning Economic Aid to Later Repatriated Soldiers. 80
In sum, belligerents during both World Wars followed customary
international law. The Detaining Power was responsible for providing
care for the injured POW during his captivity, but after repatriation,
the responsibility shifted to the Power of Origin.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 418-19 (listing and explaining the four types of compensation presently
granted in France).
176. SURVEY OF BENEFITS, supra note 171, at 55.
177. See Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 420.
178. Id. at 419.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 421.
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4. Article 68 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention: Codifying
Longstanding Customary International Law
Because Article 27 was ineffective and never followed by belliger-
ents, the International Committee of the Red Cross recommended that
it be replaced in the 1949 Third Geneva Convention with a stipulation
for the "Home Country" to compensate members of its armed forces
for work-related injuries persisting after repatriation."' In approving
the deletion of Article 27 and the insertion of such a stipulation, the
Commissioner recognized that this stipulation was, in fact, the view of
customary international law and was the practice followed by
belligerents.18 2
Article 54 [21 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention requires the
Detaining Power to provide POWs, who have been injured in work-
related activity, with all necessary care during their captivity.' 83 It fur-
ther requires the Detaining Power to provide the injured POWs with a
certificate upon their release to "enable them to submit their claims to
the Power on which they depend [Power of Origin] .... ,,18" Article 68
[1] adds the requirement that "any claim by a prisoner of war for com-
pensation in respect of an injury or other disability arising out of work
shall be referred to the Power on which he depends [Power of Origin] .
. .."185 These two provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention
return to the pre-1929 procedure for compensating injured POWs.
The Home Country's obligation, pursuant to Article 68, is best
summarized as follows:
Both prior customary international law and the provisions of
the 1949 Third [Geneva] Convention contemplate that, based
upon the facts certified, the Power of Origin will then [after
repatriation] take the necessary action under its domestic laws
to ensure appropriate compensation to its injured nationals; and
that if it lacks applicable laws, it will enact them.'8 6
This was the longstanding practice of belligerents which was ultimately
codified in Articles 68 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention.' 87
181. See REPORT OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 165.
182. Id.
183. See 1949 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2.
184. Id.
185. Id. at art. 68.
186. Opinion of Professor Levie, supra note 13, at 68.
187. Id. at 159.
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5. The Kamibayashi Court's Error
International law relating to compensation of wages is distinct
from international law relating to compensation for injuries. Just as
Conventions have assigned separate articles to address these two types
of compensation,188 so too has customary international law established
distinct requirements for each. 189 However, the Tokyo District Court
consolidated its analysis of both types of compensation. 90 As a result,
the District Court confused its examination of international law with
regard to these two distinct obligations.
For instance, in analyzing historical trends, the Court compared
Article 32 of the UK-Germany Agreement with Article 51 of the US-
Germany Agreement.191 Article 32 of the UK-Germany Agreement re-
quired the Detaining Power to give the injured POW a certificate upon
his release so that the POW could make a claim for compensation for
the injury against the Power of Origin. 92 However, Article 51 of the
US-Germany Agreement was a wage-payment provision requiring the
Detaining Power to pay the credit balance of a POW upon his re-
lease.19 If the Court was analyzing compensation for injury, it should
have instead focused on Article 92 of the US-Germany Agreement
which related to injuries."9 4 It then would have seen that both the UK-
Germany and US-Germany Agreements had the same requirements
with regard to compensating POWs for work-related injuries. 195 The
Court never cited Article 92 of the US-Germany Agreement, nor did it
188. See 1949 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2 (having separate articles to
address compensation of wages and compensation for injuries). See also 1929 Geneva
Convention, supra note 38 (also having separate provisions addressing these two types
of compensation).
189. Compare supra text accompanying notes 106-39 (establishing that custom-
ary international law requires the Detaining Power to compensate POWs for credit
balances upon their release from captivity) with supra text accompanying notes 141-87
(establishing that customary international law required the Power of Origin to compen-
sate POWs for injuries after their repatriation).
190. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
191. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 411-12.
192. Agreement between the British and German Governments Concerning Pris-
oners of War and Civilians, The Hague, July 14, 1918, art. 32, Parl. Papers, Misc No.
20 (1918); 111 BFSP 279.
193. See Agreement between the United States of America and Germany Con-
cerning Prisoners of War, Sanitary Personnel, and Civilians, Berne, November 11,
1918, art. 51, [1918] For. Rel. U.S., The World War, Supp. 2, at 103 (1933); 13
A.J.I.L. Supp. 1.
194. Id. at art. 92.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 145-47.
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cite the similarity of the two agreements in providing compensation for
injuries.
The mixing together of conventional provisions with regard to
compensation of wages and injuries after repatriation prevented the
Kamabayashi court from correctly recognizing the trend of customary
international law relating to compensation for injuries after repatria-
tion. Although the Court identified the procedure called for in Article
27 of the 1929 Geneva Convention as being similar to the Russian Pro-
posal adopted in the Copenhagen Convention,' 9 it was unable to deter-
mine that this procedure was contrary to existing customary require-
ments."" Moreover, in the Court's summary of the practice of
compensation in which States engaged, it continued to mix compensa-
tion for working pay with compensation for work-related injury.1 98
Had the Court treated each type of compensation separately, it
would have recognized that customary international law with regard to
compensation for injuries required the Power of Origin to compensate
its repatriated nationals. 99 Unlike the new wage-payment provision of
Article 66, which was not grounded in international custom,200 Article
68 was a codification of the longstanding customary international law
that existed at the end of World War II and prior to the 1949 Third
Geneva Convention. 0 If the Tokyo District Court had properly ana-
lyzed the two articles, it would have required the Japanese Government
to compensate the injured plaintiffs.
V. KAMIBAYASHi'S IMPACT ON POW CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION
If affirmed on appeal, the Tokyo District Court's decision in
Karnibayashi will deny POWs a cause of action in customary interna-
tional law against their Home Government for compensation of wages
and injuries after repatriation. This result may not have a great impact
on future POWs because most States have already ratified the 1949
Third Geneva Convention and the Convention has already taken effect
in those States. 2 Former POWs from World War II, however, will be
196. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 412.
197. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
198. Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 416-22.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 106-40.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 186-87.
202. See ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 69, at 557-562 (listing all of the States
which have ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their date of ratification). Most
States ratified the Convention between 1949 and 1970. The most recent ratifications
were in 1986, when Saint Christopher, Nevis, and Eguatorial Guinea acceded to the
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affected by Kamibayashi's decision if they were repatriated prior to the
effective date of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention. These former
POWs must rely on the existence of customary international law in
order to be compensated for wages or injuries after repatriation.
POWs from the recent Persian Gulf War can take advantage of
Articles 66 and 68 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention. They can
recover compensation from their Home Country for wages and injuries
after repatriation. Because the States involved in the Persian Gulf War
ratified the 1949 Third Geneva Convention many years ago,2"' the ret-
roactivity of Articles 66 and 68 will not be an issue. Customary inter-
national law will not be necessary to support the claim of today's
POWs since conventional law favors their position.
The former POWs from World War II, whose Home Country or
Detaining Power did not ratify the 1949 Third Geneva Convention six
months prior to their repatriation,2' will continue to suffer if the
Kamibayashi Court is affirmed. Assuming that their claims are not
barred by a Statute of Limitations, former POWs from World War II
will not have a claim against their Home Country for compensation of
their wages or injuries after repatriation. The Court will deny that cus-
tomary international law supports their claim against the Power of Ori-
gin for either type of compensation. 0 6
VI. CONCLUSION
POWs that were repatriated after World War II and before the
effective date of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention cannot use the pro-
visions of the Convention retroactively to seek compensation for their
wages or for their work-related injuries suffered in captivity. In addi-
tion, customary international law does not provide them with any com-
pensation for their wages from the Power of Origin. However, custom-
ary international law does provide injured POWs, as a subset of all
Convention. Id.
203. The major States involved in the Persian Gulf War, including Iraq, France,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Italy, Kuwait, the United States and the United Kingdom, had
ratified the 1949 Third Geneva Convention by 1957. ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note
69, at 557-62.
204. The Japanese POWs of World War II who were plaintiffs in this case are
clearly an example of the former POWs who will suffer if the Tokyo District Court's
decision is upheld.
205. See, e.g., Kamibayashi, 29 I.L.M. at 436 (stating that "the existence of cus-
tomary international law as claimed by the Plaintiffs [former POWs from World War
II whose former Detaining Power did not ratify the 1949 Third Geneva Convention
prior to their repatriation) cannot be recognized").
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wage-seeking POWs, with relief after repatriation for injuries from
their Home Government. By merging its analysis of customary interna-
tional law relating to compensation for wages with customary interna-
tional law regarding compensation for injuries, the Tokyo District
Court denied Japanese POWs that were detained in the Soviet Union
relief for their injuries.
Present and future injured POWs will receive compensation from
their Home Country for wages and injuries after repatriation pursuant
to the provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention. The
Kamabayashi Court's decision will not affect future POWs. However,
the Court creates a huge inequity with regard to former, injured POWs
who can not avail themselves of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention
and whose Home Countries refuse to voluntarily provide them compen-
sation for wages and injuries after repatriation. Despite the prevailing
customary practice after World War II, which placed the burden of
compensating injuries after repatriation on the Power of Origin, the
Tokyo District Court chose not to recognize this obligation as a matter
of customary international law.
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